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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Corwin was tried by a jury and found guilty of driving under the influence.
Following a bench trial, he was also found guilty of the felony enhancements alleged by
the State. Although the district court ordered that a substance abuse evaluation be
performed for purposes of sentencing, no such evaluation was ever received. The
district court sentenced Mr. Corwin to ?O years, with five years fixed.
Mr. Corwin timely appeals, and asserts that the district court improperly admitted
opinion testimony from two law enforcement officers that invaded the province of the
jury because this testimony embraced the ultimate question of Mr. Corwin's guilt of the
charged offense. He further asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct that rose
to the level of fundamental error when she expressed her personal opinion of
Mr. Corwin's guilt during closing argument. Finally, Mr. Corwin asserts that the district
court manifestly disregarded I.C.R. 32 when it sentenced Mr. Corwin without the benefit
of the substance abuse evaluation that was ordered in this case and required by statute,
and further abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Corwin's Idaho Criminal Rule 35
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion requesting that such an evaluation be performed.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In early June of 2007, Stephanie Lane, Julian Agirre, and Kenneth Seward were
all traveling westbound on highway 1-84 between Nampa and Caldwell. (Part I Trial

~ r . ' p.28,
,
L.18 - p.29, L.20; p.53, L . l l - p.54, L.4; p.64, Ls.3-21.) They were driving at
approximately 9:00 p.m., but the sun was just beginning to set and there was still some
daylight illuminating the road. (Part I Trial Tr., p.38, Ls.12-14; p.43, Ls.10-18.)
While traveling at approximately 70 miles per hour, Ms. Lane looked in her
rearview mirror and saw a white car approaching at a high rate of speed. (Part I Trial
Tr., p.29, Ls.21-24; p.38, Ls.22-24.) She was in the passing lane at the time, and there
was a truck in the right-hand lane next to her. (Part I Trial Tr., p.30, Ls.3-10.) Ms. Lane
testified at trial that she was able to observe that the driver of the car was a white male
with dark hair. (Part I Trial Tr., p.31, L.14 - p.32, L.10.) However, she did not indicate
in her statement to police many of the driver's features that she would later testify to at
trial. (Part I Trial Tr., p.41, L.16 - p.42, L.14.)
Ms. Lane then sped up so that she could change lanes and get out of the
speeding car's way. (Part I Trial Tr., p.32, Ls.16-23.) Believing that the driver behind
her had rear-ended her car, she also pulled over to the side of the road after moving out
of the passing lane. (Part I Trial Tr., p.33, Ls.13-19.) Shortly after Ms. Lane pulled off
the highway, she observed the white car spin and flip over onto the median. (Part I Trial
Tr., p.33, Ls.20-23.) The white car eventually came to rest upside-down on the highway
median. (Part I Trial Tr., p.34, Ls.9-12.)

Because there are multiple volumes of transcripts of proceedings in this case, for
ease of reference, citations to the transcript will be made according to the nature of the
proceeding. The transcripts for the jury trial for Part I of the State's Information, held on
October 23 and 24, 2007; and the sentencing hearing held on January 2, 2008; are
contained in the same volume of transcripts of proceedings but have independent page
numbers. The transcript of proceedings of the bench trial for Parts II and Ill of the
State's Information, held on October 25, 2007, is contained in a separate volume.

Mr. Agirre also observed the white car shortly before the driver lost control of that
car. (Part I Trial Tr., p.53. L . l l

- p.56, L.4.)

The white car passed Mr. Agirre and cut in

front of him before spinning out. (Part I Trial Tr., p.54, L.25 - p.56, L.18.) Mr. Agirre
never saw the driver of the car, could not tell whether the driver was male or female,
and never saw any person exit the car and leave the scene. (Part I Trial Tr., p.55,
Ls.17-23; p.59, Ls.23-24.)
As with Ms. Lane and Mr. Agirre, Mr. Seward was passed by the white car before
it spun out and flipped onto its roof on the median. (Part I Trial Tr., p.65, L.16 - p.68,
L.7.) Mr. Seward was driving at approximately 80 miles per hour when the white car
passed him.

(Part I Trial Tr., p.66, Ls.2-4.)

Although his view of the driver was

obscured by the driver's ballcap, Mr. Seward testified that the car was being driven by a
white male. (Part I Trial Tr., p.66, L.13 - p.67, L.6; p.77, Ls.20-22.)
After the white car came to rest in the median, Ms. Lane saw a man in jeans and
a tee shirt crossing to the opposite side of the highway from the area of the car. (Part I
Trial Tr., p.36, L.16 - p.38, L.ll.) Mr. Seward called 911 to report the accident. (Part I
Trial Tr., p.77, L.23 - p.78, L.5.)
When law enforcement arrived at the scene of the accident, there were several
people who had pulled over to the side of the road but the driver of the white car was no
longer at the scene. (Part I Trial Tr., p.84, Ls.11-19; p.85, Ls.5-15.) Officer Anthony
Pittz, who was first on the scene, stated that there was an odor of an alcoholic beverage
coming from the inside of the car and amber-colored liquid dripping out of it. (Part I Trial
Tr., p.80, L.5 - p.87, L.18.) He also testified that he saw beer cans near the outside of

the car, but didn't see any beer cans in the car's interior. (Part I Trial Tr., p.87, L.19

-

p.88, L.1.)
After talking to witnesses, Officer Pittz crossed to the far side of the highway to
look for the person who had been seen leaving the white car after it had come to rest on
its top. (Part I Trial Tr., p.88, L.16

- p.89, L.1.)

He saw Mr. Corwin standing behind a

bush in the adjacent field. (Part I Trial Tr., p.88, Ls.4-19; p.97, Ls.1-7.) Mr. Corwin was
talking on a cellular phone when Officer Pittz asked to speak to him. (Part I Trial Tr.,
p.91, Ls.3-4.) Although Mr. Corwin initially continued to speak on the phone while
approaching the officer, he hung up when Officer Pittz requested that he do so. (Part I
Trial Tr., p.91, Ls.11-17.)
The officer testified that Mr. Corwin had what appeared to be blood on his tee
shirt but that Mr. Corwin initially denied any knowledge of the accident. (Part I Trial Tr.,
p.91, L.15

- p.92,

L.4.) Officer Pittz then handcuffed Mr. Corwin and led him back

towards the scene of the accident. (Part I Trial Tr., p.94, Ls.4-11.) According to the
officer, Mr. Corwin's breath smelled of alcohol and his eyes were "glassy and
bloodshot." (Part I Trial Tr., p.94, L.12 - p.95, L.14.) Additional law enforcement
officers arrived shortly after Officer Pittz brought Mr. Corwin to the accident scene.
(Part ITrialTr., p.114, L.23-p.115, L.13.)
Trooper Deshan Cabaong responded to the scene of the accident and
interrogated Mr. Corwin. (Part I Trial Tr., p.150, L.7

- p.151, L.12;

p.163, L.12 - p.164,

L.lO.) As he was investigating the scene, Trooper Cabaong saw an empty box of
Busch beer and a Budweiser beer can lying in the median near the overturned car.
(Part I Trial Tr., p.157, Ls.6-16; 261, Ls.18-25; Exhibit 2.) Although he didn't see any

liquid substance inside of the car, the trooper smelled alcohol when he was examining
the inside of the white car. (Part I Trial Tr., p.159, L.17

- p.160,

L.6.) Mr. Corwin

maintained throughout his questioning by the officer that he was not the person who
was driving the white car; and that his girlfriend, Sunday Bender, was the driver. (Part I
Trial Tr., p.169, L.24-p.170, L.9; p.186, Ls.10-20.)
Mr. Corwin was arrested for driving under the influence (hereinafter, DUI).~ (R.,
pp.4, 32-35.) Upon being arrested and transported to the jail, Mr. Corwin refused to
submit to a breath test. (Part I Trial Tr., p. 187, L.9 - p. 194, L.4.) He was charged with
felony driving under the influence. (R., pp.32-35.) The State alleged that Mr. Corwin
had twice been previously convicted of driving under the influence within the previous
ten years, and therefore his alleged act of driving under the influence should be
elevated to a felony charge pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(5). (R., pp.32-35.) Mr. Corwin
was also charged by information with being a persistent violator. (R., pp.57-58.)
At trial, Ms. Lane, Mr. Agirre, and Mr. Seward all testified about their
observations of the white car's movements immediately preceding the accident. (Part I
Trial Tr., p.28, L.18 - p.78, L.15.) Ms. Lane identified Mr. Corwin as the driver of the
white car. (Part I Trial Tr., p.33, Ls.3-12.) The State also presented the testimony of
several law enforcement officers who were present following the crash. (Part I Trial Tr.,
p.80, L.5 - p.273, L.25.)
As noted, Officer Pittz testified that, upon encountering Mr. Corwin in a field
adjacent to the highway, he detected the smell of an alcoholic beverage on Mr. Corwin's

Mr. Corwin was also charged with the misdemeanor offense of leaving the scene of a
property damage accident, but was ultimately acquitted of this offense by the district
court. (Parts Il & Ill Trial Tr., p.50, Ls.14-22.)

breath, and Mr. Corwin's eyes were bloodshot and glassy. (Part I Trial Tr., p.94, L.12 p.95, L.14.) The officer testified that both of these were indications that the person is
under the influence of alcohol. (Part I Trial Tr., p.96, Ls.3-14.) But Officer Pittz did not
detect any difficulty in Mr. Corwin's speech and could not detect any difficulty in his
movements other than those normally found when a person is handcuffed. (Part I Trial
Tr., p.96, Ls.15-25.)
The prosecutor then asked, over Mr. Corwin's objection, whether Officer Pittz
believed that Mr. Corwin was intoxicated based upon the officer's "training and
experience." (Part I Trial Tr., p.lOO, Ls.8-13.) The district court overruled Mr. Corwin's
objection and permitted Officer Pittz to testify that he did believe that Mr. Corwin was
intoxicated. (Part I Trial Tr., p.lOO, Ls.13-14.)
The State also presented the testimony of Trooper Cabaong. (Part I Trial Tr.,
p.142, Ls.10-15.) The officer testified as to his observations of the empty beer box and
beer can near where the white car had come to rest in the median. (Part I Trial Tr.,
p. 157, Ls.6-16; p.261, Ls. 18-25.)

He also testified that, during his questioning of

Mr. Corwin, the officer smelled alcohol on his breath, Mr. Corwin's eyes were bloodshot,
and his movements during the interrogation were shaky. (Part I Trial Tr., p.165, L.7 p.166, L.22.) The officer also thought that Mr. Corwin was unsteady when he was
asked to perform the single field sobriety test that the trooper administered. (Part I Trial
Tr., p.175, L.23

- p.176,

L.l; p.178, Ls.21-25.) When he was transported to jail, the

trooper believed that Mr. Corwin was being argumentative with the officer. (Part I Trial
Tr., p.167, L.22-p.168, L.23.)

When asked if he was driving the car, Mr. Corwin informed the officer he had
been drinking, but that his girlfriend, Ms. Bender, was driving. (Part I Trial Tr., p.169,
L.24 - p. 170, L.9; p.186, Ls.10-20.) According to Mr. Corwin's description, Ms. Bender
is a petite red-haired woman. (Part I Trial Tr., p.170 Ls.10-15.) Although the trooper
had no recollection of whether Mr. Cowin had provided any contact information for
Ms. Bender, the officer testified that he never located or questioned her about the
accident. (Part I Trial Tr., p.170, Ls.16-22.) Trooper Cabaong did not believe that the
position of the driver's seat of the white car was consistent with someone of
Ms. Bender's height of five feet tall. (Part I Trial Tr., p.173, Ls.13-25.)
As with Officer Pittz, the prosecutor asked Trooper Cabaong whether he had
concluded that Mr. Corwin was under the influence of alcohol based on the officer's
training and experience. (Part I Trial Tr., p.187, Ls.3-8.) The officer responded that this
was his conclusion. (Part I Trial Tr., p.187, Ls.6-8.) Over Mr. Corwin's objection, when
asked a second time whether the officer believed that Mr. Corwin was legally too
impaired to drive, the trooper again responded that this was his conclusion. (Part I Trial
Tr., p.196, L.15 - p.197, L.3.) Trooper Cabaong also informed the jury that Mr. Corwin
refused to take a breath test after being arrested. (Part I Trial Tr., p.187, L.9 - p.194,
L.4.)
On cross-examination, Trooper Cabaong acknowledged that Mr. Corwin had
consistently maintained that Ms. Bender was the person who had been driving on the
night of the accident. (Part I Trial Tr., p.210, L.2 - p.211, L.2.) He also testified that
there was no way of determining how long the empty beer box or the beer can had been
present on the median next to the white car and that the officer never asked Mr. Corwin

how much he had to drink or how long before the accident he had consumed alcohol.
(Part1 TrialTr., p.214, L.20-p.216, L.14; p.262, Ls.1-13.)
Mr. Corwin was found guilty by the jury of driving under the influence. (R., p.99.)
He waived his right to a jury trial as to Parts II and Ill of the State's Information, which
alleged that he had two prior DUI convictions and that he was a persistent violator, and
proceeded to a bench trial on these allegations. (Part I Trial Tr., p.3, L.16 - p.5, L.6; R.,
pp.34-35, 66-67, 98.) At this bench trial, the State informed the district court that it was
moving to dismiss Part Ill of the information, alleging that Mr. Corwin was a persistent
violator, because the State lacked sufficient evidence to establish Mr. Corwin's prior
offenses as required under I.C.

5

19-2514. (Parts II & Ill Trial Tr., p.41, L.22 - p.42,

L.9.) The district court granted the State's motion and dismissed the persistent violator
allegation. (Parts Il & Ill Trial Tr., p.42, Ls.12-16.)
However, upon hearing the State's evidence, the district court found that the
State had established beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Corwin had two prior
violations, one pursuant to I.C.

5

18-8004 and one under what the district court found

was a substantially conforming statute out of Washington State. (Parts II & Ill Trial Tr.,
p.39, L.8 - p.41, L.lO.) Therefore, the district court found Mr. Corwin guilty of the felony
enhancements alleged in Part I1of the State's Information. (Parts II & Ill Trial Tr., p.41,
Ls.7-1I.)
After indicating its intent to order a presentence evaluation report, the district
court asked the parties whether this was "an appropriate case to have an alcohol
evaluation." (Parts II & Ill Trial Tr., p.43, Ls.10-I 1.) The State indicated that it was, and
Mr. Corwin raised no objection. (Parts II & Ill Trial Tr., p.43, L.12.) The district court

then stated, "I think that would be required. I will order an alcohol evaluation to be
prepared."

(Parts II & Ill Trial Tr., p.43, Ls.13-15.)

The district court then asked

Mr. Corwin whether he wished to use his own evaluator for the evaluation, to which
Mr. Corwin indicated that the evaluator normally used by the county was acceptable.
(Parts Il & Ill Trial Tr., p.43, Ls.16-21.)
While the district court ordered this evaluation on the record, there appears to be
no separate written order for this evaluation entered by the district court. (R., p.3.)
However, the district court's Notice of Order for Presentence Report contains an order
for a drug and alcohol evaluation. (R., p.105.) Despite this fact, no drug and alcohol
evaluation appears to have been performed in this case.
Mr. Corwin received a unified sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, for
felony DUI. (Sentencing Tr., p.15, Ls.9-16; R., pp.113-114.) He was also ordered to
pay $112.50 for restitution and a fine of $2,000, and his driving privileges were
suspended for five years, commencing upon his release from incarceration.
(Sentencing Tr., p.15, L.24-p.16, L.4; R., pp.113-114.)
Acting pro se, Mr. Corwin then filed a Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of his
sentence. (R., pp.127-130.) In this motion, Mr. Corwin asserted, inter alia, that a
substance abuse evaluation should have been ordered in his case for purposes of
sentencing. (R., p.127.) He further asserted that, had such evaluation been prepared
for sentencing, it would have revealed mitigating evidence that likely would have
resulted in a lower sentence. (R., p.127.)

Mr. Corwin also acknowledged that he

suffered from substance abuse problems and that he accepted responsibility for the
harms that his addiction had caused. (R., p.127.)

He further brought to the district

court's attention the fact that he had previously mentioned the failure to perform the
substance abuse evaluation that the district court ordered in his PSI. (R., p.129; PSI,
p. 13.)
The State objected to Mr. Corwin's request for leniency regarding his sentence,
and his implicit request for a substance abuse evaluation, based upon its assertion that
Mr. Corwin had not presented new and additional information. (R., pp.131-132.)
The district court denied Mr. Corwin's Rule 35 motion without a hearing. (R.,
pp.133-138.)

In doing so, the district court identified the following bases from Mr.

Corwin's Rule 35 motion as supporting his request for leniency: (1) rehabilitation; (2)
alleged errors in the PSI regarding his criminal history; and (3) the fact that no one was
injured as a result of his offense. (R., p.135.) The district court failed to acknowledge in
any way Mr. Corwin's claims that a substance abuse evaluation should have been
performed in his case in aid of sentencing. (R., pp.133-138.) However, the district court
did note that it was aware of Mr. Corwin's "significant drug and alcohol issues." (R.,
p.136.)
Mr. Corwin timely filed a Notice of Appeal from the district court's judgment and
commitment. (R., pp.113-I 17.)

ISSUE

1.

Did the State's questions regarding whether law enforcement officers believed
that Mr. Corwin was intoxicated impermissibly invade the province of the jury?

2.

Did the prosecutor's closing remarks at sentencing regarding the prosecutor's
personal belief in the guilt of the defendant constitute prosecutorial misconduct?

3.

Did the district court manifest disregard I.C.R. 32 when it sentenced Mr. Corwin
without the benefit of the substance abuse evaluation that was ordered for
purposes of sentencing, and further abuse its discretion when it denied
Mr. Corwin's Rule 35 motion that requested such evaluation be actually
performed?

ARGUMENT

The State's Questions Reaardina Whether Law Enforcement Officers Believed That
Mr. Corwin Was lntoxicated lmoermissibly lnvaded The Province Of The Jury
A.

Introduction
In this case, the district court permitted law enforcement officers to repeatedly

testify, over Mr. Corwin's objections, as to the ultimate issue for the jury's determination:
whether Mr. Corwin was driving under the influence of alcohol. The prosecutor elicited
these opinions as expert testimony and emphasized the officer's conclusions during
closing arguments. Because the issue of whether Mr. Corwin was under the influence
of alcohol was a finding solely for the jury to determine, and because the officer's
statements were not of value to assist the trier of fact on this issue as it was within the
jury's ability to evaluate the circumstantial evidence on its own, admission of this
testimony was error that prejudiced Mr. Corwin's right to a jury trial.
B.

The State's Questions Reqarding Whether Law Enforcement Officers Believed
That Mr. Corwin Was lntoxicated lmpermissiblv lnvaded The Province Of The

Jun/
Expert witnesses may testify in the form of an opinion provided that: (1) they are
properly qualified as an expert by their knowledge, skill, experience, or training; and
(2) their specialized knowledge will assist the trial of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue. I.R.E. 702. Idaho Rule of Evidence 704 also provides that
opinion testimony "is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact." I.R.E. 704.

However, ldaho case law consistently recognizes that the provisions of I.R.E.
704, which permits opinion testimony that embraces an ultimate issue, must be read in
conjunction with I.R.E. 702. See, e.g., State v. Hester, 114 ldaho 688, 696, 760 P.2d
27, 35 (1988).

Specifically, where the expert opinion testimony only serves to

"impermissibly evaluate the circumstances and render the same conclusion the jury was
asked to render by its verdict," then such testimony is improperly admitted. Id.; see also
State v. Raudebaugh, 124 ldaho 758, 768, 864 P.2d 596, 606 (1993); State v. Johnson,
119 ldaho 852,855,810 P.2d 1138,1141 (1991).
The Court in Hester adopted the following language and reasoning of the Kansas
Supreme Court in State v. Lash, 699 P.2d 49 (Kan. 1985):
[Tlhe opinion testimony of experts on the ultimate issue or issues is not
admissible without limitations. Such testimony is admissible only insofar
as the opinion will aid the jury in the interpretation of technical facts or
when it will assist the jury in understanding the material in evidence. ...
Where the normal experience and qualifications of lay jurors permit them
to draw proper conclusions from given facts and circumstances, expert
conclusions or opinions are inadmissible.
Hester, 114 ldaho at 696, 760 P.2d at 35 (internal citation omitted).
Where an expert testifies as to his or her opinion as to an ultimate issue in a
case, and where such testimony is not based on specialized experience and training
such that a lay juror could not be expected to meaningful interpret the evidence on his
own, this testimony impermissibly invades on the province of the jury and should not be
admitted. Id. Admission of expert testimony that invades the province of the jury

constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to a jury triaL3 See State v. Walters, 120
ldaho 46,48, 813 P.2d 857, 859 (1991).
The prosecutor in this case elicited testimony from Officer Pittz and Trooper
Cabaong that specifically called on these officers, based on their specialized training
and experience, to render an expert opinion as to the whether Mr. Corwin was legally
intoxicated. With regard to Officer Pittz, the prosecutor asked, "Based on your training
and your experience did you believe Mr. Corwin to be under the influence of alcohol?"
(Part I Trial Tr., p.lOO, Ls.8-14.) Over Mr. Corwin's objection, the officer was permitted
to answer that this was his belief. (Part I Trial Tr., p.100, Ls.11-14.)
Trooper Cabaong was asked similar questions by the prosecutor twice during his
testimony. When asked why the trooper transported Mr. Corwin to jail, the trooper
answered, "[blecause I determined that he was under the influence of alcohol and under
arrest." (Part I Trial Tr., p.187, Ls.1-5.) The prosecutor followed up by asking whether
the officer reached that conclusion based upon his training and experience, to which the
officer replied in the affirmative. (Part I Trial Tr., p.187, Ls.6-8.)
Later on in Trooper Cabaong's testimony, the prosecutor again asked for a
conclusion regarding "Mr. Corwin and his ability to successfully operate a motor
vehicle." (Part I Trial Tr., p.196, Ls.15-20.) Over Mr. Corwin's objection, the officer was
permitted to testify that he believed that Mr. Corwin was too impaired to operate a motor
vehicle. (Part I Trial Tr., p.196, L.21 - p.197, L.3.)

Both the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 7 of the ldaho
Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a trial by jury. See, e.g., State
v. Stover, 140 ldaho 927, 104 P.3d 969 (2005).

This testimony went to the ultimate determination that the jury was called upon to
render in this case: whether Mr. Corwin was driving while under the influence of alcohol.
The officers' testimony, as elicited by the prosecutor, mirrored precisely the language
used by both the relevant statute and case law as the core definition of the offense.
The core prohibition of I.C.

9

18-8004 is against persons who are under the

influence of alcohol or other intoxicating substances having actual physical control of a
motor vehicle. The testimony of both officers parroted the language of the statute when
expressing their opinions at trial.

(Part I Trial Tr., p.100, Ls.8-14; p.187, Ls.3-8.)

Additionally, the prosecutor elicited testimony regarding whether Trooper Cabaong
thought that Mr. Corwin was impaired and whether his consumption of alcohol affected
his ability to operate a motor vehicle. (Part I Trial Tr., p.196, L.15

- p.197, L.3.)

This

language has been consistently applied in relevant case law as definitive of being under
the influence of alcohol for purposes of I.C. § 18-8004. See, e.g., Sfafe v. Mace, 133
ldaho 903, 905, 994 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Ct. App. 2000); Sfafe v. Bronnenberg, 124 ldaho
67, 70, 856 P.2d 104, 107 (Ct. App. 1993); Sfafe v. Andrus, I 1 8 ldaho 711, 715, 800
P.2d 107, 111 (Ct. App. 1990).
Here, the expert testimony of the officers in this case regarding whether
Mr. Corwin was, in their opinion, intoxicated, impaired, or incapable of driving safely
impermissibly invaded the province of the jury. This testimony not only embraced a
conclusion that was well within the abilities of the jurors to evaluate for themselves, but
the testimony was, in effect, an expression of the officer's opinion as to the ultimate
issue of Mr. Corwin's guilt. Admission of this testimony over Mr. Corwin's objections
was error.

While there appears to be no case law in ldaho directly addressing this issue, the
ldaho Court of Appeals has discussed the subtle, but real, distinction between testimony
from a law enforcement officer that a defendant's behavior is consistent with
intoxication, and testimony that the officer believes the defendant was actually
intoxicated. State v. Burrow, 142 ldaho 328, 331, 127 P.3d 231, 234 (Ct. App. 2005).
Addressing the issue of the witness' qualifications as an expert, the Burrows court
noted:
Here, the officer did not render an opinion that Burrow was under the
influence of drugs but, rather, that he displayed certain symptoms that are
consistent with those shown by persons who are under the influence of
methamphetamine and similar substances. While this distinction may be
subtle, it is nevertheless real and significant.
Id. at 331, 127 P.3d at 234.

Additionally, several other jurisdictions have addressed the question of whether
an officer may render an expert opinion that the defendant was intoxicated, and have
found that such testimony is improper because it invades upon the province of the jury.
The Supreme Court of Arizona, in a supplementary opinion, held that permitting
opinion testimony that the defendant was "drunk," "intoxicated," or "under the influence"
is improper because it violates the province of the jury. Fuenning v. Superior Coult In
and For Maricopa County, 680 P.2d 121, 136 (Ariz. 1983). As noted by the Fuenning
court, "When, in a DWI prosecution, the officer is asked whether the defendant was
driving while intoxicated, the witness is actually being asked his opinion of whether the
defendant was guilty. In our view, such questions are not within the spirit of the rules."
Id. The court in Fuenning proceeded to note that such questions give rise to the danger

that the jury will convict or acquit based upon the evaluations of guilt provided by the

witness rather than their own consideration of the evidence. Id.; see also State v.
Heirera, 51 P.3d 353, 357 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
The Supreme Court of Hawaii has likewise found error in admission of testimony
from police officers as to a legal conclusion regarding a defendant's impairment or
ability to safely operate a vehicle. Stafe v. Vliet, 983 P.2d 189, 197-198 (Haw. 1999).
Among the reasons why the officer's testimony was deemed improper was that it
"embraced the ultimate legal issue in the case." Id. at 198. The court in Vliet held that,
whether by lay or expert opinion, the officer should have been limited to testifying as to
the articulable facts which he had observed, such as the defendant's performance on
the field sobriety test, along with other alleged indicators of intoxication such as the
smell of alcoholic beverage on the defendant's breath and the officer's observation that
the defendant glassy, irritated eyes. Id.
The error in this case was not harmless. The prosecutor asked two different
officers, over Mr. Corwin's objection, whether, based on their specialized training and
experience, they believed that Mr. Corwin was under the influence of alcohol, unable to
operate his vehicle, or impaired. (Part I Trial Tr., p.100, Ls.8-14; p.196, L.$5 - p.197,
L.3.)

During closing arguments, the prosecutor again emphasized the specialized

training and experience of the law enforcement officers when the prosecutor stated:
You've heard from both officers. Both officers, based on their training,
based on their experience gave an opinion as to whether or not they
believed Mr. Corwin could safely operate a motor vehicle. Officer Pittz,
who has been an officer for years, who is a field training officer himself,
gave his opinion. Based in my opinion I believe Mr. Corwin was too - was
under the influence and too impaired to drive a motor vehicle.
(Part I Trial Tr., p.313, Ls.16-24.)

The prosecutor made similar remarks immediately following the above quoted
passage reiterating Trooper Cabaong's conclusion that "Mr. Corwin was under the
influence of alcohol and could not safely operate a motor vehicle," based upon the
trooper's specialized training and experience. (Part I Trial Tr., p.313, L.25

- p.314,

L. 10.)
The repeated elicitation of and emphasis on this testimony, in conjunction with
the emphasis on the officers' specialized training and experience, called upon the jury to
defer to the opinions of these officers as to matters that were fully within the
qualifications of the jurors to determine for themselves. As such, the admission of this
testimony over Mr. Corwin's repeated objections violated Mr. Corwin's right to a jury trial
and was not harmless.
II.
The Prosecutor's Closinq Remarks At Sentencing Reqardinq Her Personal Belief In The
Guilt Of The Defendant Constituted Prosecutorial Misconduct
A,

Introduction
At closing argument, the prosecutor stated a personal belief, expressly rooted in

her own opinion, that Mr. Corwin was "under the influence and too impaired to drive a
motor vehicle."

(Part I Trial Tr., p.313, Ls.22-24.)

This remark was sandwiched

between references to the personal opinions of two law enforcement officers that
Mr. Corwin was under the influence of alcohol, which was the central issue that the jury
was charged with determining. In this case, given the improperly admitted testimony of
the officers giving such an opinion, and the inherent appeal to the prestige of the
prosecutor's station when referring to the prosecutor's personal opinion as to guilt, this

argument rose to the level of a fundamental error that deprived Mr. Corwin of his right to
a fair trial.
B.

The Prosecutor's Closinq Remarks At Sentencinq Reaarding Her Personal Belief
In The Guilt Of The Defendant Constituted Prosecutorial Misconduct
Closing argument serves the important purpose of clarifying the issues presented

to the jury for their resolution in a criminal case. State V. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 86, 156
P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007).

Both the prosecution and defense are afforded

considerable latitude in closing arguments, and are entitled to discuss the evidence and
inferences therefrom based on their respective viewpoints. Id.
However, while both sides are given considerable latitude, this latitude is not
unbounded.

With regard to the closing remarks of the prosecutor, these remarks

cannot properly include an expression of the personal belief or opinion of the prosecutor
as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant and it constitutes misconduct for a
prosecutor to express such an opinion. Id; State v. Garcia, 100 ldaho 108, 110-111,
594 P.2d 146, 148-149 (1979). Additionally, the expression of a personal opinion as to
the guilt or innocence of a defendant on the part of a prosecutor violates the general
ethical duty of attorneys to refrain from stating a personal opinion as to the guilt or

MODELRULE3.4(e); I.R.C.P.
innocence of an accused. See AMERICANBARASSOCIATION
3.4(e).
In this case, the prosecutor expressed a personal belief regarding Mr. Corwin's
guilt, and did so based upon her personal opinion. The prosecutor stated the following
during closing arguments:
You've heard from both officers. Both officers, based on their training,
based on their experience gave an opinion as to whether or not they

believed Mr. Corwin could safely operate a motor vehicle. Officer Pittz,
who has been an officer for years, gave his opinion. Based in my opinion I
believe Mr. Cotwin was too - was under the influence and too impaired to
drive a motor vehicle.
(Part I Trial Tr., p.313, Ls.16-24 (emphasis added)).
In the absence of an objection to the misconduct at trial, this Court will only
review a claim of prosecutoriaf misconduct for the first time on appeal if the misconduct
constitutes fundamental error. State v. Lovelass, 133 ldaho 160, 167, 983 P.2d 233,
240 (Ct. App. 1999). "Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of a fundamental error
only if the acts or comments constituting the misconduct are so egregious or
inflammatory that any ensuing prejudice cannot be remedied by a curative jury
instruction." Id.
The error in this case rises to the level of a fundamental error. There is a special
danger that inheres when a prosecutor expresses a personal belief that the defendant is
guilty because of the prestige of the prosecutor's office, and very real possibility that
jurors may be more likely to defer to representations of the prosecution in light of that
prestige.

It has long been recognized in ldaho that prosecutors, "are part of the

machinery of the court, and . . . occupy an official position, which necessarily leads
jurors to give more credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of
the trial and in the presence of the jury than they will give to counsel for the accused."
See State v. Irwin, 144 ldaho 82, 110, 156 P.2d 583, 611 (1903). And a fair trial,
"certainly implies a trial in which the attorney representing the state does not throw the
prestige of his public office, information from its records, and the expression of his own
belief of guilt into the scales against the accused." State v. Case, 298 P.2d 500, 503
(Wash. 1956).

This prejudice was increased in light of the fact that the prosecutor inserted
expressions of her own personal opinion between reiterations of the personal opinions
of two law enforcement officers who also opined during their testimony that they
believed that Mr. Corwin was "under the influence" or "impaired." The same danger that
the jury will defer to a prosecutor based upon the perceived prestige or status of that
office is also present with regard to the opinions expressed by law enforcement officers.
As noted by the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Montgomery, the testimony of
police officers may convey to the jury an "aura of reliability" which may otherwise sway
the minds of jurors.

Montgomery, 183 P.3d 267, 276 (Wash. 2008).

Through

connecting her personal opinion as to Mr. Corwin's guilt to the previously admitted
opinion testimony of the law enforcement officers of the same, the prosecutor was
inextricably intertwining these opinions to convey the sense to the jury they should defer
to these opinions as to Mr. Corwin's guilt, rather than their own evaluation.
Additionally, because there was no testing of Mr. Corwin's blood or breath to
establish Mr. Corwin's blood alcohol content, the State's evidence that Mr. Corwin was
driving under the influence of alcohol was based on circumstantial evidence of
intoxication. (Part I Trial Tr., p.187, L.9 - p.194, L.4.) There was testimony that
Mr. Corwin smelled of alcohol; had bloodshot, glassy eyes; had shaky movements; and
was "argumentative" with police. (Part I Trial Tr., p.94, L. 12 - p.95, L. 14; p. 165, L.7 p.168, L.23.)
But there were counter-indications to some of this evidence as well. Officer Pittz
did not detect any slurred speech and Mr. Corwin's motor skills were, in the officer's
opinion, consistent with someone who is handcuffed. (Part I Trial Tr., p.96, Ls.15-25.)

There was testimony that there was no way to establish how long the empty box of beer
and beer cans in the median had been there, and therefore no way to reliably connect
these cans to the car that Mr. Corwin was alleged to have been driving. (Part I Trial Tr.,
p.214, L . l l

- p.215, L.2; p.262, Ls.1-13.)

And the arresting officer admitted that he had

never asked Mr. Corwin how many drinks he had consumed, nor how long before being
questioned by police Mr. Corwin had consumed alcohol. (Part I Trial Tr., p.215, L.23 p.216, L.17.) Moreover, the testimony at trial indicated that Mr. Corwin violently crashed
his car while driving at a high rate of speed, which could account for some of the
physical shakiness or difficulties in speech that the officers observed. (Part I Trial Tr.,
p.28, L.18- p.78, L.15.)
Additionally, the district court had already ruled that the jury could hear and
consider the personal opinions of the officers as to Mr. Corwin's guilt. See Part I, supra.
Through intertwining the prosecutor's own opinion of Mr. Corwin's guilt with the
previously admitted opinions of the officers, which the district court had already decided
to let the jury consider, it is likely that a curative instruction to disregard only the
prosecutor's improper remarks would be of no avail.
The evidence of Mr. Corwin's guilt was not overwhelming, and much of the
circumstantial evidence of his intoxication presented was reasonably called into
question through cross-examination.

Moreover, the particular danger of the jury

deferring to the personal opinion of the prosecutor has long been recognized in Idaho
and other jurisdictions. Under the facts of this case, the ensuing prejudice resulting
from the prosecutor's expression of her personal opinion of Mr. Corwin's guilt could not
have been cured by an instruction from the district court. As such, the prosecutorial

misconduct in this case rose to the level of a fundamental error that denied Mr. Corwin
his right to a fair trial.
111.
The District Court Acted In Manifest Disregard Of I.C.R. 32 When It Sentenced
Mr. Corwin Without The Benefit Of The Substance Abuse Evaluation That Was Ordered
For Purposes Of Sentencing, And Further Abused Its Discretion When It Denied
Mr. Corwin's Rule 35 Motion That Reauested Such Evaluation Be Actuatlv Performed
A.

Introduction
Prior to sentencing, the district court ordered that a substance abuse evaluation

be performed on Mr. Corwin for the court's use at sentencing. However, no evaluation
was performed and this deficiency was readily apparent both through Mr. Cowin's
remarks to the presentence investigator and through a notation in the PSI that a
substance abuse evaluation should be inserted.

There was no other information

contained in the PSI that constituted an evaluation of Mr. Corwin's condition or any
recommendation for potential treatments or sentencing alternatives. In light of this plain
deficiency, and despite the court's order finding that such evaluation was necessary in
this case, the district court sentenced Mr. Cowin without having all of the requisite
information that a substance abuse evaluation would provide. This constituted manifest
disregard for I.C.R. 32(f) and I.C. $18-8005(9), which mandates that a substance abuse
evaluation be ordered in DUI cases.
Moreover, Mr. Corwin sought to rectifj this deficiency in sentencing information
when he requested that a substance abuse evaluation be performed in his Rule 35
motion. The district court, without any anaiysis or acknowledgment of this request,

denied Mr. Corwin's motion. This denial constitutes an abuse of the district court's
discretion.
B.

The District Court Manifestlv Disregarded I.C.R. 32 When It Sentenced
Mr. Convin Without The Benefit Of The Substance Abuse Evaluation That Was
Ordered For Purposes Of Sentencing
Mr. Corwin asserts that the district court manifestly disregarded I.C.R. 32 when it

sentenced Mr. Corwin without the benefit of a substance abuse evaluation to inform the
district court's determinations at sentencing.
At the outset, it should be noted that Mr. Corwin did not object to the lack of a
substance abuse evaluation at ~entencing.~(Sentencing Tr., p.4, L.15 - p.5, L.9.)
However, this Court has recognized that a defendant may challenge the adequacy of
the contents of the PSI for the first time on appeal where the defendant can show that
the district court acted in manifest disregard of the requirements of I.C.R. 32. See, e.g.,
State

V.

Toohill, 103 ldaho 565, 566, 650 P.2d 707, 708 (Ct. App. 1982). Additionally,

where statutory provisions indicate that consideration of certain types of information or
the ordering of certain evaluations is mandatory at sentencing, sentencing of the
defendant in absence of such an evaluation can constitute manifest disregard of the
provisions of I.C.R. 32. See State v. Durham, - I d a h o , 195 P.3d 723 (Ct. App.
2008); Sfate v. Craner, 137 ldaho 188, 189-190,45 P.3d 844, 845-846 (Ct. App. 2002).

This Court may wish to note that, while Mr. Corwin did not specifically object to the
failure of the PSI to contain a substance abuse evaluation as was ordered in this case,
the district court's questions regarding the contents of the PSI focused exclusively on
whether Mr. Corwin had objections to the factual accuracy of the contents of the report,
rather than whether Mr. Corwin had any other general objections as to the report's
contents. (Sentencing Tr., p.4, Ls.24-25; p.5, Ls.6-8.)

ldaho Criminal Rule 3 2 0 provides that a sentencing judge may order an
additional investigation of the case if the judge deems it necessary, and the judge may
further use the information obtained through this additional investigation in considering
the disposition of the case. I.C.R. 320. While the language of Rule 3 2 0 is permissive,
stating that the district court may order additional investigation, there are two salient
facts that made the creation and inclusion of a substance abuse evaluation mandatory
for purposes of sentencing in this case: (1) a substance abuse evaluation was actually
and explicitly deemed necessary and ordered by the district court, thus making the
generation of this report mandatory; and (2) the ldaho Legislature has determined that
such evaluations are mandatory in DUI cases. I.C.R. 320; I.C. § 18-8005(9); (Parts I1&
Ill Trial Tr., p.43, Ls.10-I 5.).
The district court in this case, with regard to the ordering of an evaluation
regarding Mr. Cowin's alcohol abuse and potential addiction, stated that, "I think that
would be required. I will order an alcohol evaluation to be prepared." (Parts II & Ill Trial
Tr., p.43, Ls.13-15.) The district court also entered its order for the substance abuse
evaluation within its Notice of Order for Presentence Report. (R., p.105.)
Additionally, under I.C. 3 18-8005(9), when a defendant has been found guilty of
the provisions of I.C.

3

18-8004, that defendant is required to undergo an alcohol

evaluation prior to the date of sentencing. I.C. 18-8005(9). This statutory provision
provides for only two exceptions that would permit the district court to proceed to
sentencing in absence of such a report. First, the requirement for an evaluation may be
waived if the defendant has no other prior or pending DUI convictions and the court has
information from other reliable sources indicating that the defendant does not regularly

abuse alcohol or drugs. I.C. Ij 18-8005(9). Second, the requirement may be waived by
the district court "if the court has a presentence investigation report, substance abuse
assessment, criminogenic risk assessment, or other assessment which evaluates the
defendant's degree of alcohol abuse and need for alcohol treatment conducted within
twelve (12) months preceding the date of the defendant's sentencing." I.C.

3 18-

8005(9). Neither exception applies under the record in this case.
Moreover, the PSI affirmatively indicated both the absence of, and the need for,
this evaluation. Mr. Corwin reported to the presentence investigator that he was an
alcoholic and a drug addict.

(PSI, p.12.)

He expressed that he was willing to

successfully participate in any treatment program ordered by the district court. (PSI,
p.?3.) Mr. Corwin also noted to the investigator that "he never underwent a drug/alcohol
evaluation as requested on the PSI order." (PSI, p.13.) Under the section entitled
"Treatment Programs AndlOr Optional Recommendations," the investigator's sole
recommendation was "Incarceration under the custody of the ldaho State Board of
Correction." (PSI, p.15.)
Finally, the clearest indication to the district court that the sentencing information
contained within the PSI was plainly inadequate in light of the requirements of I.C. Ij 188005(9) and I.C.R. 32(f) was the following line contained at the conclusion of the PSI:
"INSERT DRUG AND ALCOHOL EVALUATION." (PSI, p.15.)
Finally, this error was not harmless because the district court received no
information regarding appropriate treatments that may be available to Mr. Corwin and
recommended no drug or alcohol treatments during his incarceration as part of
Mr. Corwin's sentence. (Sentencing Tr., p.15, L.9 - p.17, L.2.) ldaho Code 18-8005(9)

provides that the district court "shall take the evaluation into consideration in
determining an appropriate sentence." I.C. § 18-8005(9). The district court failed to
abide by the clear directives of the Legislature when it sentenced Mr. Corwin without the
benefit of this report. This failure occurred despite the district court's acknowledgment
that Mr. Corwin did "have significant drug and alcohol issues." (Sentencing Tr., p.13,
Ls.14-15.)

As such, the district court manifestly disregarded I.C.R. 32 when it

sentenced Mr. Corwin without the benefit of the substance abuse evaluation that was
ordered and statutorily required in this case.
C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Corwin's Request,
Pursuant To His Rule 35 Motion. That The District Court Actually Order The
Substance Abuse Evaluation To Be Performed
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the

sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. Stafe v. Trent,
125 ldaho 251, 253, 869 P.2d 568, 570 (Ct. App. 1994), citing State v. Forde, 113 ldaho
21, 740 P.2d 63 (Ct. App.1987), and Sfate v. Lopez, 106 ldaho 447, 680 P.2d 869
(Ct. App. 1984). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are
the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was
reasonable." Id., citing Lopez, 106 ldaho at 450, 680 P.2d at 872. "If the sentence was
not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in
view of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id., citing
State v. Hernandez, 121 ldaho 114, 822 P.2d 1011 (Ct. App. 1991).
While most requests for leniency pursuant to Rule 35 motions contest only the
length of the defendant's sentence, the manner in which the sentence is imposed can

also be examined in the context of a Rule 35 motion. Sfafe v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820,
822-825, 186 P.3d 676, 678-681 (Ct. App. 2008). This can include issues regarding the
failure of the district court to acquire necessary evaluations to be used for purposes of
sentencing. Id.
As a component of his request for a reduction of his sentence, Mr. Corwin, in his
pro se Rule 35 motion for a reduction of his sentence, implicitly asked for a substance
abuse evaluation because the information provided in such an evaluation, "would
mitigate defendant's sentence."

(R., p.127.)

He later reiterated his belief that he

suffered from alcoholism, and asserted that he had asked the presentence investigator
in his case for a substance abuse evaluation. (R., p.129.)
Despite Mr. Corwin's request, the district court's order on his Rule 35 motion fails
to even acknowledge the absence of a substance abuse/alcohol evaluation in this case.
(R., pp.135-137.) The district court's order only acknowledges the grounds raised by
Mr. Corwin as, "1) rehabilitation, 2) the PSI contained errors related to the number of the
defendant's prior felonies, and 3) the sentence is unduly severe as the defendant did
not injure anyone in relation to this crime." (R., p.135.)
Mr. Corwin brought the district court's attention to the failure to acquire the
substance abuse evaluation that was mandated under the facts of this case. The
district court did not acknowledge, much less respond, to this issue. As such, the
district court also abused its discretion when it failed to order a substance abuse
evaluation be performed for reconsideration of Mr. Corwin's sentence pursuant to
Mr. Corwin's Rule 35 motion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Corwin respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction
and sentence and remand this case for a new trial. In the alternative. Mr. Corwin asks
that this Court vacate the district court's sentence and remand this case to the district
court for a new sentencing hearing upon completion and submission of an appropriate
substance abuse evaluation.
DATED this 8thday of December, 2008.
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